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Abstract
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1 Introduction
In games with incomplete information, the private information of each agent is represented
by his type. The type of each agent contains information about the preferences of the
agents and information about the beliefs of the agents. The type of agent can therefore
be decomposed into a payo￿ type and a belief type. The payo￿ type of an agent embodies
information about the players payo￿ and the belief type embodies information about the
players’ belief and higher order beliefs. In games with incomplete information, the strategy
of an agent may naturally depend on his entire type, namely his payo￿ type and his belief
type. In large type spaces, and certainly in the universal type space, each agent may have
di￿erent belief types associated with the same payo￿ type. The prediction of play in a game
of incomplete information may therefore be sensitive to the payo￿ type as well as the belief
type.
In this paper we consider three solution concepts for games of incomplete information
which depend only on the payo￿ types but not on the belief types of the agent. The three
solution concepts are (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete informa-
tion correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. As these solution concepts do not
depend on the beliefs and higher order beliefs of the agent, we refer to them as belief free
solution concepts. Having de￿ned the solution concepts, we give their epistemic founda-
tions and establish relationships between the solution concepts. We then use these solution
concepts in supermodular games and potential games with incomplete information. We
should emphasize that these solution concepts have already been de￿ned in the literature.
Rather, the contribution of this paper is to present epistemic foundations for these solution
concepts and establish their relationship to each other.
The notion of ex post equilibrium is the most demanding among the three solution
concepts. The term \ex post equilibrium" is due to Cremer and McLean (1985).1 It
requires that in equilibrium, the strategic choice of each type of each player remains a best
response ex post, that is after the payo￿ type of each agent has become public. The ex post
equilibrium is frequently used as solution concept in mechanism design where the game is
speci￿cally designed so as to support truthtelling as an ex post equilibrium (e.g. Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002)).
In earlier work, Bergemann and Morris (2005) showed that the ex post equilibrium can
1Earlier, D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) de￿ne the same notion in a private value environment
as uniform equilibrium and Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) refer to uniform incentive compatibility in the
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be understood as a solution concept which embeds robustness to beliefs and higher order
beliefs in the following sense: a social choice function can be truthfully implemented in
every type space in an interim equilibrium if and only if it can be truthfully implemented
as an ex post equilibrium. The ex post equilibrium is thus a belief free solution concept as
it requires that the strategies of the players remain an equilibrium for all possible beliefs
and higher order beliefs. The objective of this paper is to describe belief free solution
concepts in a general game theoretic environment. Here, and in contrast to the mechanism
design environment, the notion of an ex post equilibrium is very demanding and in many
games an ex post equilibrium does not exist. We shall therefore de￿ne and analyze weaker
solution concepts, namely incomplete information correlated equilibrium and incomplete
information rationalizability. In games with a ￿nite number of actions and a ￿nite number
of payo￿ types, the existence of these solution concepts is proved by construction.
We say that an action is incomplete information rationalizable for a payo￿ type of an
agent if it survives the process of iteratively elimination of dominated strategies. The notion
of incomplete information rationalizability is belief free as the candidate action needs only
to be a best response to some beliefs about the other agents actions and payo￿ types. This
solution concept was studied under this name in Battigalli (1999); his work was incorporated
in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003), where \￿-rationalizability" is used to refer to a general
dynamic version of rationalizability and ￿ refers to common knowledge restrictions on
beliefs. It is important to emphasize that the rationalizability of an action is de￿ned with
respect to the payo￿ type rather than the type of an agent as in the notions of interim
rationalizability of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) and Ely and Peski (2006).
We say that a strategy pro￿le forms an incomplete information correlated equilibrium
if there exists some distribution over payo￿ types and actions such that every action taken
by a payo￿ type of an agent is a best response given the distribution over payo￿ types and
actions. The notion of incomplete information correlated equilibrium corresponds (up to
some minor di￿erences) to the universal Bayesian solution suggested in Forges (1993).
The epistemic foundations of incomplete information rationalizability and incomplete in-
formation correlated equilibrium present the natural generalizations of their complete infor-
mation counterparts by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann (1987), respectively.
In proposition 1 we show that a speci￿c action of a payo￿ type is incomplete information
rationalizable if and only if there exists type space and an interim equilibrium such that
the message is an equilibrium action for a type with a given payo￿ type in the type space.
Also in proposition 1, we show that an action is an element of an incomplete informationBelief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 4
correlated equilibrium for a payo￿ type of an agent if and only if there exists a type space
with a common prior for which the speci￿c message is a Bayes Nash equilibrium action for
a type with that payo￿ type in the hierarchical type space. With respect to the ex post
equilibrium, we show that a strategy pro￿le forms an ex post equilibrium if and only if the
strategies of the payo￿ types remain interim equilibrium strategies on all type spaces.
The three solution concepts are nested in the appropriate manner. We show that if for
a given payo￿ type, an action is an element of an ex post equilibrium pro￿le, then it is also
an element of an incomplete information correlated equilibrium for the given payo￿ type.
Likewise, if an action is an element of an incomplete information correlated equilibrium for
a given payo￿ type, then it is also incomplete information rationalizable for the given payo￿
type.
In the case of supermodular games, the relationships between these three solution con-
cepts can be further strengthened. In particular, we show that in generic supermodular
games the set of rationalizable actions are single valued for all agents and all payo￿ types if
and only if the set of correlated equilibrium actions are single valued. Moreover, if indeed
they are single valued, then they form an ex post equilibrium. A second important class
of games in this context is the class of Bayesian potential games. We show that if a game
has a smooth concave potential for every payo￿ type pro￿le and also has an ex post equi-
librium, then the ex post equilibrium forms the unique incomplete information correlated
equilibrium.
We restrict our attention to solution concepts for normal form (or static) games. In
contrast, Kalai (2004) and Borgers and McQuade (2007) develop belief free solution concepts
for extensive form games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the belief free so-
lution concepts in a ￿nite environment. Section 3 gives the relevant de￿nitions for compact
action and payo￿ type spaces. We also consider a common interest game with quadratic
payo￿s to apply the solution concepts. Section 4 presents the epistemic foundations of the
solution concepts. Section 5 establishes some relations between these solution concepts in
general games. Section 6 obtains additional results in supermodular games. Section 7 con-
siders Bayesian potential games and presents conditions for a unique incomplete information
correlated equilibrium. Section 8 concludes.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 5
2 Belief Free Solution Concepts
There are I players. Player i chooses an action ai 2 Ai and has a payo￿ type ￿i 2
￿i, where Ai and ￿i are ￿nite sets. To ensure a clear comparison with the litera-
ture, we also allow for uncertainty about "unknown payo￿ relevant variables," states that
are not known by any agent; let ￿0 be a ￿nite set of unknown payo￿ relevant states,
with typical element ￿0. Now ￿ = ￿0 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿I is the relevant uncertainty
space. We write a￿i = (a1;::;ai￿1;ai+1;:::;aI), ￿￿i = (￿0;￿1;::;￿i￿1;￿i+1;:::;￿I) and
￿￿f0;ig = (￿1;::;￿i￿1;￿i+1;:::;￿I). Now a belief free incomplete information game is given
by the payo￿ functions u = (ui)
I
i=1 where each ui : A ￿ ￿ ! R. Thus \payo￿ types" em-
body information about player’s payo￿s but we have no information about players’ beliefs
or higher order beliefs about other players’ payo￿ types or unknown payo￿ relevant states.
We report natural generalizations of the complete information solution concepts of (cor-
related) rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 (Incomplete Information Rationalizability)
The incomplete information rationalizable actions R = (Ri)
I
i=1, each Ri : ￿i ! 2Ai￿
?, are
de￿ned recursively as follows. Let R0




> > > > <








there exists ￿i 2 ￿(A￿i ￿ ￿￿i) such that
(1) ￿i (a￿i;￿￿i) > 0 ) aj 2 Rk
j (￿j) for each j 6= i








> > > > =
> > > > ;
for each k = 1;2;:::; and




This solution concept was studied under this name in Battigalli (1999); this work was
incorporated in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003), where \￿-rationalizability" is used to
refer to a general dynamic version of rationalizability and ￿ refers to common knowledge
restrictions on beliefs. Their de￿nition reduces to the one above in a static setting when
￿ is the empty set. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) assumed that all payo￿ relevant
variables are known by some agent, so, in our language, the set ￿0 is a singleton. This
solution concept has played an important role in our work on robust full implementation
(see Bergemann and Morris (2001), Bergemann and Morris (2007a) and Bergemann and
Morris (2007b)). Note that Ri (￿i) is non-empty for each i and ￿i 2 ￿i by construction.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 6
De￿nition 2 (Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium )
A probability distribution ￿ 2 ￿(A ￿ ￿) is an incomplete information correlated equilibrium
















Many incomplete information versions of correlated equilibrium have been de￿ned:
Forges (1993) proposed ￿ve "legitimate" ones. The above de￿nition corresponds to the
most general in Forges (1993) - i.e., the universal Bayesian approach of section 6. She
does not explicitly incorporate "payo￿ types", i.e., payo￿ relevant variables that are known
by one agent. Thus, in our language, it is as if each ￿i were a singleton. She notes in
proposition 4 that the set of payo￿s that might arise under this solution concept is equal
to the set of payo￿s that might arise under more stringent solutions concepts if players are
allowed to observe some su￿ciently rich private signals. Forges (1993) deals with two
player games, but Forges (2006) discusses the straightforward extension to many players;
here she refers to the solution concept as the "Bayesian solution" of the game. The type
correlated equilibria of Cotter (1994) are essentially equivalent to this de￿nition, with the
proviso that he ￿xes the prior distribution on ￿, so the equilibrium describes a distribution
on A conditional on each realized ￿.2
















￿i (ai), if ￿ = ￿￿;
0, otherwise.
Moreover, for any   2 ￿(￿), there exists an ICE whose marginal on ￿ is  : for every












2In an earlier paper, Cotter (1991), analyzes the notion of a correlated equilibrium with type dependent
strategies. In the correlated equilibrium with type dependent strategies the randomization device is restricted
to be independent of the type of each player. In the current de￿nition we allow the correlation device to
depend on the type pro￿le realization.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 7
be any Nash equilibrium of the complete information game (ui (￿;￿￿))
I
i=1, and let





We denote the set of actions taken by payo￿ type ￿i of agent i in some incomplete informa-
tion correlated equilibrium by Ci (￿i), so formally we have
Ci (￿i) = fai 2 Ai j9 ICE ￿ and (a￿i;￿￿i) 2 A￿i ￿ ￿￿i such that ￿((ai;a￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) > 0g.
(1)
We de￿ne an ex post equilibrium. A payo￿ type strategy for player i is a function
si : ￿i ! Ai.
De￿nition 3 (Ex Post Equilibrium)
A payo￿ type strategy pro￿le s￿ = (s￿
i)
I





















for all ai 2 Ai:
"Most" games will not have ex post equilibria. But the solution concept has been
extensively studied in the mechanism design literature (where the game is constructed to
have ex post equilibria). In particular, truthtelling is an ex post equilibrium in a direct
mechanism if and only if it is ex post incentive compatible. Holmstrom and Myerson (1983)
is an early reference dealing with ex post incentive compatibility (under the name "uniform
incentive compatibility"). Ex post equilibrium has recently been studied in general game
theory contexts (see, e.g., Kalai (2004) and Borgers and McQuade (2007)).
3 Compact Action and Type Spaces and an Example
Let the framework be as before except that each Ai and ￿i are compact intervals of the
real line and each ui is continuous in a and ￿. We let ￿0 be a singleton and thus do not
refer to it.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 8
3.1 Solution Concepts
The de￿nition of rationalizability becomes:
De￿nition 4 (Incomplete Information Rationalizability)
The incomplete information rationalizable actions R = (Ri)
I
i=1, each Ri : ￿i ! 2Ai￿
?, are
de￿ned recursively as follows. Let R0




> > > > > <









there exists ￿i 2 ￿(A￿i ￿ ￿￿i) such that
(1) ￿i
hn
(a￿i;￿￿i) : aj 2 Rk
j (￿j) for each j 6= i
oi
= 1








> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
for each k = 1;2;:::; and




The compactness and continuity assumptions ensure that Ri (￿i) is well-de￿ned and
trans-￿nite iterations are not required.
De￿nition 5 (Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium )
A probability distribution ￿ 2 ￿(A ￿ ￿) is an incomplete information correlated equilibrium







We de￿ne Ci (￿i) - the set of actions that can be played by type ￿i in an incomplete
information correlated equilibrium of game u - for the compact action and type spaces case
of this section. We will say that a￿
i 2 Ci (￿￿
i) if for each " > 0, there exists an ICE ￿ with
￿[f(a;￿)jai 2 [a￿
i ￿ ";a￿
i + "] and ￿i 2 [￿￿
i ￿ ";￿￿
i + "]g] > 0.
3.2 Quadratic Example
Let Ai = ￿i = [0;1] for all i and let
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for some ￿ 2 R. Note that this is a common interest game. Now suppose agent i has type
￿i and belief ￿i 2 ￿(A￿i ￿ ￿￿i). Then his expected utility from choosing action ai is




























Setting this equal to zero gives agent i’s best response:








In this game, we have
Ri (￿i) =
(
f￿ig, if ￿ 1






f￿ig, if ￿ 1
I￿1 < ￿i < 1;
[0;1], otherwise,
and there is a unique ex post equilibrium s￿ with s￿
i (￿i) = ￿i for all ￿i 2 [0;1].















and was shown (in a mechanism design application) as the leading example in Bergemann
and Morris (2007a). If ￿ < 0, then the game has strategic complementarities and well known
arguments imply that there will not be a gap between extremal rationalizable outcomes and
correlated equilibria. Thus ￿ 1
I￿1 < ￿ will remain a tight characterization for correlated
equilibria for ￿ ￿ 0. If ￿ ￿ 1, it is easy to show that every action can be element of
a correlated equilibrium. Later arguments will establish the claim of Ci (￿i) = f￿ig if
￿ 1
I￿1 < ￿ < 1.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 10
4 Epistemic Foundations for the Solution Concepts
These belief free solution concepts are of interest not because we think that players don’t
have beliefs and higher order beliefs, but because we do not know what they are. In this
section, we review results that explain why it make sense to use these solution concepts as
a reduced form description of what might happen in more fully speci￿ed environments with
beliefs and higher order beliefs. We return to the ￿nite case to avoid technicalities.
4.1 Type Spaces






1. Ti is a ￿nite set of types
2. b ￿i : Ti ! ￿(T￿i ￿ ￿0) describes the beliefs of i’s types
3. b ￿i : Ti ! ￿i describes the payo￿ types of agent i’s types
We write T = T1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ TI and T￿i = T1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ Ti￿1 ￿ Ti+1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ TI; ti is typical
element of Ti, t = (ti)
I
i=1 and t￿i = (t1;:::;ti￿1;ti+1;:::;tI); we let b ￿ : T ! ￿￿0 be de￿ned











A type space T has a common prior ￿￿ 2 ￿(T ￿ ￿0) if, for all i and ti 2 Ti,
X
t￿i;￿0
￿￿ (ti;t￿i;￿0) > 0;
and











for all t￿i 2 T￿i and ￿0 2 ￿0. A type space T is a common prior type space if there exists
￿￿ 2 ￿(T) such that T has common prior ￿￿. A type space T is a payo￿ type space if
each Ti = ￿i and each b ￿i is the identity map. A type space T is a full support type space
if b ￿i (ti)[t￿i;￿0] > 0 for all i, ti, t￿i and ￿0.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 11
4.2 Interim Equilibrium
The belief free incomplete information game u and type space T together de￿ne an incom-
plete information game which may not have a common prior. A behavioral strategy of
player i in type space T is given by a function ￿i : Ti ! ￿(Ai). We write ￿i for the set
of behavioral strategies of player i.
De￿nition 6 (Interim Equilibrium)
Strategy pro￿le ￿ is an interim equilibrium of (u;T ) if for each i, ti 2 Ti, ai 2 Ai with



































￿0;b ￿i (ti);b ￿￿i (t￿i)
￿￿
.
De￿nition 7 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium)
Strategy pro￿le ￿ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for type space T with common prior ￿￿ if
































￿0;b ￿i (ti);b ￿￿i (t￿i)
￿￿
.
As is well known, this ex ante de￿nition of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is equivalent to
interim equilibrium on common prior type spaces. But in the absence of a common prior,
there is not a natural ex ante de￿nition of the incomplete information equilibrium.
4.3 Epistemic Results
We denote the set of actions played by agent i with payo￿ type ￿i in some interim equilibrium







9 a type space T , an interim equilibrium, ￿, of (u;T ),
and a type ti 2 Ti such that b ￿i (ti) = ￿i and ￿i (ai jti) > 0
)
.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 12
We denote the set of actions played by agent i with payo￿ type ￿i in some interim equilibrium









9 a common prior type space T , an interim equilibrium, ￿, of (u;T ),
and a type ti 2 Ti such that b ￿i (ti) = ￿i and ￿i (ai jti) > 0
)
.
The following proposition records the straightforward incomplete information generaliza-
tions of the epistemic foundations for rationalizability and correlated equilibrium, respec-
tively, from Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann (1987).
Proposition 1 (Epistemic Foundations)
For all i and for all ￿i,
1. Ri (￿i) = Si (￿i);
2. Ci (￿i) = SCP
i (￿i):





; (ii) an interim equilibrium
￿ of (u;T ) and (iii) a type t￿
i 2 Ti with (a) b ￿i (t￿
i) = ￿￿
i; and (b) ￿i (t￿
i)[ai] > 0. Let
Si (￿i) =
n
ai 2 Aij9ti 2 Ti s.t. ￿i (ti)[ai] > 0 and b ￿i (ti) = ￿i
o
:
































Now we show by induction on k that Si (￿i) ￿ Rk
i (￿i) for all i;￿i and k. This is true for
k = 0 by de￿nition. Suppose that it is true for k. Now ￿
￿i;ai











hypothesis. Together with (4), this establishes ai 2 Rk+1
i (￿i). This proves the induction.
Now a￿
i 2 Si (￿￿
i) ￿ Ri (￿￿
i), proving the \if" claim of the proposition.
Conversely, suppose that a￿
i 2 Ri (￿￿
i). Observe that for each i, ￿i and ai 2 Ri (￿i), there
exists ￿
￿i;ai
i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ A￿i) such that:
(a) ￿
￿i;ai
i (￿￿i;a￿i) > 0 ) a￿i 2 R￿i
￿
￿￿f0;ig
￿Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 13
and















Now construct (i) a type space T with
Ti = f(￿i;ai) 2 ￿i ￿ Ai jai 2 Ri (￿i)g,



















Now (b) ensures that ￿ is an equilibrium and by construction t￿
i = (￿￿
i;a￿
i) 2 Ti with
b ￿i (t￿
i) = ￿i; and ￿i (t￿
i)[a￿
i] > 0. This establishes the \only if" part.
For part (2), ￿rst suppose that a￿
i 2 Ci (￿￿
i). Thus there exists an ICE ￿ 2 ￿(A ￿ ￿)
and (a￿i;￿￿i) 2 A￿i ￿ ￿￿i such that ￿((a￿
i;a￿i);(￿￿






































and de￿ne each b ￿i by
b ￿i ((ai;￿i)) = ￿i.
Observe that ￿￿ is a common prior for T by construction. Now consider the strategy pro￿le











By construction, ￿ is an interim equilibrium of (u;T ). Now consider the type ti = (a￿
i;￿￿
i).
We have constructed a common prior type space T , an interim equilibrium, ￿, of (u;T ),
such that b ￿i (ti) = ￿￿
i and ￿i (a￿
i jti) > 0. Thus a￿
i 2 SCP
i (￿￿
i).Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 14
Conversely, suppose that a￿
i 2 SCP
i (￿￿
i). Thus there exists a common prior type space T
with prior ￿￿, an interim equilibrium, ￿, of (u;T ), such that b ￿i (ti) = ￿￿
i and ￿i (a￿
i jti) > 0.











By construction, ￿ is an ICE. Since the prior assigns positive probability to every type, we
have that ￿((a￿
i;a￿i);(￿￿
i;￿￿i)) > 0 for some (a￿i;￿￿i) 2 A￿i ￿￿￿i and thus a￿
i 2 Ci (￿￿
i).
Part (1) is a special case of propositions 4.2 and 4.3 in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003),
and is a straightforward generalization of the complete information argument in Branden-
burger and Dekel (1987). We recorded this result earlier as proposition 6 in the appendix of
Bergemann and Morris (2007b). Part (2) is a straightforward generalization of the complete
information argument of Aumann (1987); while Forges (1993) does not state a result in ex-
actly this form, this argument captures the idea of the incomplete information generalization
of Aumann’s analysis in Forges (1993) section 6.
The next proposition describes how we can formalize the idea that the solution concept
of ex post equilibrium makes sense if we want to identify behavior that will constitute an
equilibrium whatever players’ beliefs and higher order beliefs about others’ payo￿ types and
unknown payo￿ relevant states. Write ￿s;T for the strategy pro￿le in (u;T ) induced by s,
so that
￿s;T (si (￿i)jti) =
(
1, if b ￿i (ti) = ￿i;
0, if b ￿i (ti) 6= ￿i:
Proposition 2 (Ex Post Equilibrium)
The following are equivalent:
1. s is an ex post equilibrium
2. ￿s;T is an interim equilibrium of (u;T ) for all type spaces T
3. ￿s;T is an interim equilibrium of (u;T ) for all full support common prior payo￿ type
spaces TBelief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 15
Proof. (1) ) (2). We verify that ￿s;T satis￿es the de￿nition of an interim equilibrium


























































































￿0;b ￿i (ti);b ￿￿i (t￿i)
￿￿
.
(2) ) (3). This is true by de￿nition.
(3) ) (1). Let each Ti = ￿i and b ￿i be the identity map. For any ￿￿ 2 ￿++ (￿),





, where each b ￿i is derived from ￿￿ by Bayes
rule as in equation (2) on page 10. This type space is a full support common prior payo￿
type space. Fix ￿￿ 2 ￿ and let ￿k be any sequence of full support priors with ￿k (￿￿) ! 1
as k ! 1. Now suppose that (3) holds, so ￿s;T is an interim equilibrium of (u;T￿k) for























































This conclusion holds for each ￿￿ 2 ￿, i and ai. This proves (1).
If we restrict attention to the special case where the game is a direct revelation mecha-
nism and a planner is trying to implement a social choice function, this is a special case of
results in our earlier work on robust mechanism design, Bergemann and Morris (2005): the
arguments there do not depend on the mechanism design application and the argumentsBelief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 16
there prove the result in a general game theoretic setting.3 In a private values environment,
this result relates to earlier observation in the mechanism design literature showing the
equivalence between \Bayesian equilibrium for all beliefs" and dominant strategies equilib-
rium, e.g., Ledyard (1979).
Borgers and McQuade (2007) have stated results along these lines for general games.
In particular, they de￿ne s to be a strongly information invariant equilibrium if claim (2)
of the proposition holds. Thus their proposition 1 establishes the equivalence of (1) and
(2). They de￿ne s to be a weakly information invariant equilibrium if ￿s;T is an interim
equilibrium of (u;T ) for all type spaces T where each type of every player puts positive
probability on his opponents having any payo￿ type pro￿le. Their proposition 2 shows that
s is an ex post equilibrium if and only if it is a weakly information invariant equilibrium.
Note that claim (3) in the above proposition is in principle a stronger claim than that s is
a weakly information invariant equilibrium.
5 Relations Between Solution Concepts
We want to collect together some results on the relation between the belief free solution
concepts.
Write   2 ￿(￿) for a distribution over payo￿ type pro￿les. Write  ￿ for the distribu-
tion over payo￿ types generated by ￿, i.e.,




For any   2 ￿(￿) and payo￿ type strategy pro￿le s, we write ￿ ;s for the induced
probability distribution over A ￿ ￿, i.e.,
￿ ;s (a;￿) =
(
  (￿), if a = s(￿);
0, otherwise.
Lemma 1
If  ￿ 2 ￿++ (￿) and ai 2 Ci (￿i), then there exists an ICE ￿ such that:
1. ￿((ai;a￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) > 0 for some (a￿i;￿￿i) 2 A￿i ￿ ￿￿i; and
3It is the restriction to a social choice function (rather than a correspondence) that requires the mechanism
to depend only on players’ reported payo￿ types. In particular, the step showing (1) ) (2) in the above
proposition 2 is implied by proposition 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2005) while the step showing (3) ) (1)
is implied by proposition 3 in Bergemann and Morris (2005).Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 17
2.  ￿ =  ￿.
Proof. If ai 2 Ci (￿i), then by de￿nition there exists an ICE ￿0 such that ￿0 ((ai;a￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) >
0 for some (a￿i;￿￿i) 2 A￿i ￿ ￿￿i. Now let




 ￿ (￿) ￿ " ￿0 (￿)
￿
;
choosing " positive but su￿ciently small so that e   2 ￿(￿). Let e ￿ be any ICE with  e ￿ = e  .




If s￿ is an ex post equilibrium of u, then, for any   2 ￿(￿), ￿ ;s￿
is an ICE of u.
And an immediate corollary is:
Corollary 1
Suppose that s is an ex post equilibrium of u and, for every   2 ￿(￿), there is at most one
ICE ￿ with  ￿ =  . Then ￿ is an ICE if and only if ￿ = ￿ ;s.
We can also record some natural inclusions.
Lemma 3
For all i and ￿i 2 ￿i,
1. Ci (￿i) ￿ Ri (￿i); and
2. if s￿ is an ex post equilibrium, then s￿
i (￿i) 2 Ci (￿i).
Proof. (1) follows immediately from de￿nitions; (2) follows from lemma 2.
Proposition 3
Suppose that each Ci is single valued, i.e., there exists payo￿ strategy pro￿le s = (si)
I
i=1
such that for all i and all ￿i, Ci (￿i) = fsi (￿i)g. Then
1. if ￿ is an ICE, then there exists   2 ￿(￿) such that ￿ = ￿ ;s ; andBelief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 18
2. s is an ex post equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that Ci (￿i) = fsi (￿i)g for all i and ￿i. Let ￿ be any ICE. So
￿((ai;a￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) > 0 implies ai 2 Ci (￿i) = fsi (￿i)g for each i and thus a = s(￿￿0).
Thus
￿ ;s (a;￿) =
(
 ￿ (￿), if a = s(￿￿0);
0, otherwise.
This proves part (1). Recall that for each   2 ￿(￿), there exists ICE ￿ with  ￿ =  . By
part (1), ￿ = ￿ ;s. So








for all i and ai 2 Ai. But since this argument holds for each ￿, we have that s is an ex
post equilibrium.
6 Supermodular Games
In this section, we let ￿0 be a singleton and suppress reference to ￿0. Now suppose that
each action set and type set is complete ordered; there are increasing di￿erences in actions,
so that for each ￿ 2 ￿,






















if ai ￿ a0
i and a￿i ￿ a0
￿i; and there are increasing di￿erences in own action and states, so
that for each a￿i 2 A￿i,
















if ai ￿ a0
i and ￿ ￿ ￿0.




is single value for each a￿i and ￿. Write ai and ai for the smallest and largest actions in Ai
and ￿i and ￿i for the smallest and largest types in ￿i. Iteratively de￿ne rk
i : ￿i ! Ai and
rk
i : ￿i ! Ai as follows:
r0
i (￿i) = ai and r0
i (￿i) = ai;Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 19
and for step k + 1 :
rk+1

































and the limit points are given by:
r￿
i (￿i) = lim
k!1
rk
i (￿i) and r￿





For each i and ￿i 2 ￿i,
Ri (￿i) = fai 2 Ai jr￿








































In a generic game, each Ci is single valued if and only if each Ri is single valued.
Proof. "If" follows from lemma 3. To prove "only if", we use lemma 4. Now the proof
of the proposition is completed as follows. Suppose Ri is not single valued. Then there


































For su￿ciently small " > 0, this will be an ICE by construction: note that type ￿￿
i of player











i) is a best response while type ￿i of player














is a best response; genericity ensures that










































In a generic supermodular game, we observe the following additional results.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 20
Corollary 2




2. the best response r￿
i (￿i) is given by:
r￿









for all ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i;
3. ￿ is an ICE if and only if ￿ = ￿ ;r￿
for some   2 ￿(￿).
Proof. (1) follows from lemma 4. (2) follows from the de￿nitions of r￿
i and r￿
i and the
￿niteness of each Ai and ￿i. For (3), (2) implies that every ￿ of this form is an ICE and
Proposition 4 implies that every ICE must be of this form.
7 Potential Games and Unique ICE
We return to the compact continuous case. We say that a game u has weighted potential


















for all i, ai;a0
i 2 Ai, a￿i 2 Ai ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i. This is a belief free incomplete
information generalization of the de￿nition of a weighted potential in Monderer and Shapley
(1996);4 in particular, it is equivalent to requiring that each incomplete information game
(ui (￿;￿))
I
i=1 is a weighted potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996), using
the same weights for each ￿ 2 ￿. Game u has a best response potential v : A ￿ ￿ ! R if










This is a an incomplete information generalization of a best response potential in Morris
and Ui (2004). Note in particular that if v is a weighted potential for u, it is also a best
response potential for u. We say that v is a strictly concave potential if v (￿;￿) is a strictly
concave function of a for all ￿ 2 ￿.
4See Heumen, Peleg, Tjis, and Borm (1996) and Ui (2004) for de￿nitions of Bayesian potentials with
prior probability distributions.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 21
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness)
If u has a strictly concave smooth potential function and an ex post equilibrium s, then ￿ is
an incomplete information correlated equilibrium of u if and only if there exists   2 ￿(￿)
such that ￿ = ￿ ;s.
Proof. Neyman (1997) shows that if a complete information game v (￿;￿) (for ￿xed ￿)
has a strictly concave potential, then the unique correlated equilibrium is the unique pure








for all ￿ 2 ￿. We adapt the proof by Neyman (1997) to our belief free incomplete informa-
tion environment. We consider an arbitrary correlated equilibrium given by ￿ 2 ￿(A ￿ ￿)
and show that - if it is not generated by the ex post equilibrium - there exists an improve-
ment for at least one agent i. At any (a;￿) 2 A ￿ ￿ with a 6= s(￿), we know that
lim
"!0+
v ((1 ￿ ")a + "s(￿);￿) ￿ v (a;￿)
"
> v (s(￿);￿) ￿ v (a;￿), by the strict concavity of v
> 0, by (5).
The smoothness of v implies that that
lim
"!0+







v ((1 ￿ ")a + "(si (￿i);a￿i);￿) ￿ v (a;￿)
"
;
and we denote the partial derivative by
vsi(￿i)￿ai (a;￿) , lim
"!0+
v ((1 ￿ ")a + "(si (￿i);a￿i);￿) ￿ v (a;￿)
"
:
We know that for all a 6= s(￿), we have
I X
i=1
vsi(￿i)￿ai (a;￿) > 0.











vsi(￿i)￿ai (a;￿)d￿ > 0.
So there exists i such that Z
a;￿
vsi(￿i)￿ai (a;￿)d￿ > 0.
Thus the deviation ￿i (ai;￿i) = "si (￿i) + (1 ￿ ")ai would strictly increase agent i’s ex ante
utility for su￿ciently small " > 0.
We can apply this result to derive our characterization of Ci (￿i) in the quadratic example
of Section 3.2.
Corollary 3 (Quadratic Game)









Proof. Since it was a game of common interests and the payo￿s were quadratic, we have
the existence and smoothness of the potential function. Now we establish the conditions
for concavity. The ￿rst derivative is
dv
daj















￿1, if j = i;
￿￿, if j 6= i:














Now if ￿ < ￿ 1
I￿1, and xi = z > 0 for all i, then
xTMx = ￿￿z2I2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)z2I
= ￿Iz2 (￿I + (1 ￿ ￿))
= ￿Iz2 (￿ (I ￿ 1) + 1)
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= ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)z2
> 0.


























and if ￿ 1















































Thus v is M is negative semi-de￿nite if and only if ￿ 1
I￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and is negative de￿nite
if ￿ 1
I￿1 < ￿ < 1.
8 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to collect and compare belief free solution concepts in games
of incomplete information. Among these three concepts under consideration, the notion of
ex post equilibrium has received the widest attention in the context of mechanism design.
By comparing and relating these solution concepts, it was our objective to emphasize theBelief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 24
properties common to these belief free notions in a general game theoretic environment
rather than the special setting of mechanism design.
It is important to emphasize that all of these notions do not impose any restrictions
on the distributions over the payo￿ types. A natural question which we hope to address
in the future is how the predictions, in particular of the incomplete information correlated
equilibrium, would be re￿ned if we were to consider a given prior over payo￿ types, yet allow
for all possible belief type spaces which could be generated by a common prior type space.
This intermediate scenario is interesting as the players (and the outside observer) may have
learned or otherwise acquired information about the frequency of the payo￿ types, yet have
very little information about the current beliefs and higher order beliefs of the agents.Belief Free Incomplete Information Games September 17, 2007 25
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